The Arizona Supreme Court recently handed down an opinion on when and to what degree an amended complaint relates back to the original complaint.

Phoenix, AZ -- (ReleaseWire) -- 01/02/2007 -- The Arizona Supreme Court recently interpreted Rule 15(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. In so interpreting, the Supreme Court intended to end the disparate conclusions to which lower courts were coming as they ruled on issues of amended complaints and relating back certain filings to previous filing dates.

In this case, Tyman v. Hintz Concrete et al, CV-06-0008-PR, the plaintiff was injured at a construction site. Tyman v. Hintz Concrete et al 2. The plaintiff's attorney, unfortunately, had difficulty determining who was responsible for the construction site and initially provided notice to the City of Surprise of the intent to sue. Id. Upon discovering that the City of Surprise was not responsible for the site, the plaintiff searched for the appropriate party to sue. Id. at 2-3. With incorrect parties listed on her complaint, the plaintiff was forced to file suit immediately before the statute of limitations ran. Id. 3.

After filing her initial complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court and subsequent to Arizona's two-year statute of limitations, the plaintiff discovered and added the defendants actually responsible for the construction site where she was injured. Id. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the Maricopa County Superior Court granted and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court who upheld the lower courts' decisions. Id.

In agreeing with the lower courts' ultimate rulings, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that the Maricopa County Superior Court judge's reasoning was most in line with the Supreme Court's thinking. Id. at 6-9, 11. Although the Court of Appeals also ruled for the defendants, the Supreme Court found fault with its logic. Id. at 7-9. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court's more closely approximates the Maricopa County Superior Court's holding, although the Supreme Court also found some of the trial court's reasoning faulty. Id. 7.

Specifically, the Arizona Supreme Court's ruled that the type of mistake Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) anticipates had not occurred in Ms. Tyman's case. Rule 15's mistake provision extends to certain types of identification errors but not to situations where a party absolutely does not know who the proper defendant might be. Id. at 10-15.

Thus, Ms. Tyman's amended complaint was filed too late, her case remained dismissed and she was denied a chance at redress against the defendants.

For more information on this press release visit: http://www.releasewire.com/press-releases/release-3.htm

The Arizona Supreme Court deals with automobile warranties, service contracts and lemon law issues in recent legal decisions.

Phoenix, AZ -- (ReleaseWire) -- 10/09/2006 -- The Arizona Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving motor vehicle warranty issues. In the first, Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 130 P.3d 530; 473 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32, the questions revolved around an automobile lease situation, the Arizona Lemon law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The second case, Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge, Inc., 132 P.3d 825; 476 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33, also involved the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as well as a service contract issue.

A. Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

In denying Mr. Parrot relief under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (hereinafter the "Warranty Act") and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (commonly referred to as Arizona's Lemon Law), the Arizona Supreme Court wrestled with two primary issues, including whether Mr. Parrot was a consumer as defined by the Warranty Act and whether the limited relief available to consumers under Arizona's Lemon Law was available to him. In overturning the Arizona Court of Appeals decision that favored Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that neither the federal Warranty Act nor the state Lemon Law allowed Mr. Parrot the relief he sought.

1. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ((15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

Unfortunately for Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Mr. Parrot was not a consumer under the Warranty Act because Mr. Parrot's lessee status prevented him from qualifying as a consumer for purposes of applying the Warranty Act to his vehicle dispute. No qualifying sale to him was made and that meant the Warranty Act did not provide him relief. Upon disposing of the Warranty Act claims brought by Mr. Parrot, the court turned to the Arizona Lemon Law.

2. Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act

As it did with its analysis under the Warranty Act, the Arizona Supreme Court decided against Mr. Parrot essentially because of his status as a lessee and not an owner. Although the court noted that the definition of consumer under the Lemon Law was different than under the Warranty Act, the court decided against Mr. Parrot on other grounds.

Under the Arizona Lemon Law, two remedies are available: (a) a consumer may return the vehicle to the manufacturer, or (b) the consumer may have the vehicle replaced. However, the court noted that these remedies only apply if the consumer is the owner of the vehicle. Mr. Parrot leased the vehicle and did not own it; therefore, the Lemon Law provided him no relief.

B. Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

One month after the Parrot case, above, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on another case involving the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, DaimlerChrysler and an allegedly malfunctioning automobile. However, in this case, the car was purchased, not leased, as it was in Parrot. In addition, although the vehicle purchased was a Kia, Ms. Johnson purchased a service contract from DaimlerChrysler for the vehicle through the Chrysler dealership from which she bought the car. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case after the trial court granted Earnhardt's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in favor of Johnson. Two key issues were presented to the Arizona Supreme Court.

1. Service Contract

The Arizona Supreme Court examined the issue of whether Earnhardt had entered into a service contract with Ms. Johnson or if the service contract was only with DaimlerChrysler since they were the entity that provided the service contract.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the service contract were ambiguous and that a grant of summary judgment was inappropriate on that basis. Some of the ambiguous facts included that Earnhardt, the dealer, had sold the contract and was to provide repair services under the contract as signed by the dealership. In addition, simply put, the language of the contract itself was confusing and conflicting as were the statements of the witnesses. For example, the language of the contract variously states that DaimlerChrysler is the responsible party but also that Earnhardt had responsibility under the contract, too, while Ms. Johnson stated in her affidavit that she was told it was a joint warranty agreement with the dealership and DaimlerChrysler being responsible. The dealership, on the other hand, denied it was a party to the service contract. The conflict facts meant that the case had to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Earnhardt was a party to the service contract.

2. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

After concluding that the evidence surrounding the service contract created a question of fact allowing that issue to survive summary judgment, the Arizona Supreme Court next turned to the issue of whether the service contract was a warranty as defined by the Warranty Act. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the service contract was such a warranty, the Supreme Court disagreed reasoning that the separate consideration paid for the service contract means that the service contract cannot also be a written warranty under the definition contained within the Warranty Act.

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the Johnson case back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its reasoning.

For more information on this press release visit: http://www.releasewire.com/press-releases/release-3.htm

Phoenix, AZ -- (ReleaseWire) -- 10/09/2006 -- The Arizona Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving motor vehicle warranty issues. In the first, Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 130 P.3d 530; 473 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32, the questions revolved around an automobile lease situation, the Arizona Lemon law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The second case, Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge, Inc., 132 P.3d 825; 476 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33, also involved the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as well as a service contract issue.

A. Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

In denying Mr. Parrot relief under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (hereinafter the "Warranty Act") and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (commonly referred to as Arizona's Lemon Law), the Arizona Supreme Court wrestled with two primary issues, including whether Mr. Parrot was a consumer as defined by the Warranty Act and whether the limited relief available to consumers under Arizona's Lemon Law was available to him. In overturning the Arizona Court of Appeals decision that favored Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that neither the federal Warranty Act nor the state Lemon Law allowed Mr. Parrot the relief he sought.

1. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ((15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

Unfortunately for Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Mr. Parrot was not a consumer under the Warranty Act because Mr. Parrot's lessee status prevented him from qualifying as a consumer for purposes of applying the Warranty Act to his vehicle dispute. No qualifying sale to him was made and that meant the Warranty Act did not provide him relief. Upon disposing of the Warranty Act claims brought by Mr. Parrot, the court turned to the Arizona Lemon Law.

2. Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act

As it did with its analysis under the Warranty Act, the Arizona Supreme Court decided against Mr. Parrot essentially because of his status as a lessee and not an owner. Although the court noted that the definition of consumer under the Lemon Law was different than under the Warranty Act, the court decided against Mr. Parrot on other grounds.

Under the Arizona Lemon Law, two remedies are available: (a) a consumer may return the vehicle to the manufacturer, or (b) the consumer may have the vehicle replaced. However, the court noted that these remedies only apply if the consumer is the owner of the vehicle. Mr. Parrot leased the vehicle and did not own it; therefore, the Lemon Law provided him no relief.

B. Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

One month after the Parrot case, above, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on another case involving the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, DaimlerChrysler and an allegedly malfunctioning automobile. However, in this case, the car was purchased, not leased, as it was in Parrot. In addition, although the vehicle purchased was a Kia, Ms. Johnson purchased a service contract from DaimlerChrysler for the vehicle through the Chrysler dealership from which she bought the car. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case after the trial court granted Earnhardt's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in favor of Johnson. Two key issues were presented to the Arizona Supreme Court.

1. Service Contract

The Arizona Supreme Court examined the issue of whether Earnhardt had entered into a service contract with Ms. Johnson or if the service contract was only with DaimlerChrysler since they were the entity that provided the service contract.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the service contract were ambiguous and that a grant of summary judgment was inappropriate on that basis. Some of the ambiguous facts included that Earnhardt, the dealer, had sold the contract and was to provide repair services under the contract as signed by the dealership. In addition, simply put, the language of the contract itself was confusing and conflicting as were the statements of the witnesses. For example, the language of the contract variously states that DaimlerChrysler is the responsible party but also that Earnhardt had responsibility under the contract, too, while Ms. Johnson stated in her affidavit that she was told it was a joint warranty agreement with the dealership and DaimlerChrysler being responsible. The dealership, on the other hand, denied it was a party to the service contract. The conflict facts meant that the case had to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Earnhardt was a party to the service contract.

2. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

After concluding that the evidence surrounding the service contract created a question of fact allowing that issue to survive summary judgment, the Arizona Supreme Court next turned to the issue of whether the service contract was a warranty as defined by the Warranty Act. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the service contract was such a warranty, the Supreme Court disagreed reasoning that the separate consideration paid for the service contract means that the service contract cannot also be a written warranty under the definition contained within the Warranty Act.

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the Johnson case back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its reasoning.

For more information on this press release visit: http://www.releasewire.com/press-releases/release-3.htm

Phoenix, AZ -- (ReleaseWire) -- 10/09/2006 -- The Arizona Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving motor vehicle warranty issues. In the first, Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, 130 P.3d 530; 473 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 32, the questions revolved around an automobile lease situation, the Arizona Lemon law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The second case, Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge, Inc., 132 P.3d 825; 476 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33, also involved the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as well as a service contract issue.

A. Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

In denying Mr. Parrot relief under both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (hereinafter the "Warranty Act") and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act (commonly referred to as Arizona's Lemon Law), the Arizona Supreme Court wrestled with two primary issues, including whether Mr. Parrot was a consumer as defined by the Warranty Act and whether the limited relief available to consumers under Arizona's Lemon Law was available to him. In overturning the Arizona Court of Appeals decision that favored Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that neither the federal Warranty Act nor the state Lemon Law allowed Mr. Parrot the relief he sought.

1. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ((15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

Unfortunately for Mr. Parrot, the Arizona Supreme Court found that Mr. Parrot was not a consumer under the Warranty Act because Mr. Parrot's lessee status prevented him from qualifying as a consumer for purposes of applying the Warranty Act to his vehicle dispute. No qualifying sale to him was made and that meant the Warranty Act did not provide him relief. Upon disposing of the Warranty Act claims brought by Mr. Parrot, the court turned to the Arizona Lemon Law.

2. Arizona Motor Vehicle Warranties Act

As it did with its analysis under the Warranty Act, the Arizona Supreme Court decided against Mr. Parrot essentially because of his status as a lessee and not an owner. Although the court noted that the definition of consumer under the Lemon Law was different than under the Warranty Act, the court decided against Mr. Parrot on other grounds.

Under the Arizona Lemon Law, two remedies are available: (a) a consumer may return the vehicle to the manufacturer, or (b) the consumer may have the vehicle replaced. However, the court noted that these remedies only apply if the consumer is the owner of the vehicle. Mr. Parrot leased the vehicle and did not own it; therefore, the Lemon Law provided him no relief.

B. Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge (full text of case available at http://www.wilcoxlegal.com)

One month after the Parrot case, above, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on another case involving the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, DaimlerChrysler and an allegedly malfunctioning automobile. However, in this case, the car was purchased, not leased, as it was in Parrot. In addition, although the vehicle purchased was a Kia, Ms. Johnson purchased a service contract from DaimlerChrysler for the vehicle through the Chrysler dealership from which she bought the car. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case after the trial court granted Earnhardt's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in favor of Johnson. Two key issues were presented to the Arizona Supreme Court.

1. Service Contract

The Arizona Supreme Court examined the issue of whether Earnhardt had entered into a service contract with Ms. Johnson or if the service contract was only with DaimlerChrysler since they were the entity that provided the service contract.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the service contract were ambiguous and that a grant of summary judgment was inappropriate on that basis. Some of the ambiguous facts included that Earnhardt, the dealer, had sold the contract and was to provide repair services under the contract as signed by the dealership. In addition, simply put, the language of the contract itself was confusing and conflicting as were the statements of the witnesses. For example, the language of the contract variously states that DaimlerChrysler is the responsible party but also that Earnhardt had responsibility under the contract, too, while Ms. Johnson stated in her affidavit that she was told it was a joint warranty agreement with the dealership and DaimlerChrysler being responsible. The dealership, on the other hand, denied it was a party to the service contract. The conflict facts meant that the case had to be remanded to the trial court to determine whether Earnhardt was a party to the service contract.

2. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312)

After concluding that the evidence surrounding the service contract created a question of fact allowing that issue to survive summary judgment, the Arizona Supreme Court next turned to the issue of whether the service contract was a warranty as defined by the Warranty Act. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the service contract was such a warranty, the Supreme Court disagreed reasoning that the separate consideration paid for the service contract means that the service contract cannot also be a written warranty under the definition contained within the Warranty Act.

Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the Johnson case back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its reasoning.

Collection work is different than what most attorneys do on a daily basis. Many attorneys do not relish such work, especially if it involves suing their own clients. However, most attorneys soon realize that running a firm requires making sure that invoices get paid. Wilcox & Wilcox, P.C. wants to help lawyers and law firms reduce their accounts receivable so they may concentrate on practicing law.

Wilcox & Wilcox, P.C. provides professional, aggressive debt collection on legal debts doing so in a manner calculated to reduce the animosity that can ruin an existing relationship. In many cases, a constructive relationship with a client can be salvaged - even after debt collection procedures commence. Many people want to pay their debts but have run into unfortunate circumstances. A third party who steps in to create and monitor a repayment schedule can often restore a quality relationship between a client and his/her attorney. The bill gets paid, the client feels comfortable seeking assistance on future matters and the attorney's faith in the client is restored. Of course, some people unreasonably insist on ignoring a debt. Wilcox & Wilcox, P.C. offers experienced creditor rights litigators to pursue litigation, institute garnishments, file liens and collect debts via all available legal remedies.

Wilcox & Wilcox, P.C. is a central Arizona law firm with offices in downtown Phoenix and Goodyear. The firm offers a full array of business services. Wilcox & Wilcox, P.C. is a central Arizona law firm with offices in downtown Phoenix and Goodyear. The firm offers a full array of business services. Please visit http://www.arizonacollectionslawyer.com for more information.

For more information on this press release visit: http://www.releasewire.com/press-releases/release-3.htm